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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Kenneth Randall Smith appealed from the district judgments in two 
separate cases. In the first case (the possession case), he asserted on appeal that the 
district court erred when it his motion to suppress. In the second case (the 
aggravated assault case), he asserted on appeal that the district court erred when it 
denied his motion to suppress, and that it abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion in limine and permitted the State to impeach his credibility with his prior 
conviction for burglary. 
In Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Smith did not show that the 
district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress in the possession case. 
(Resp. Br., pp.8-15.) The also argued that Mr. Smith did not show that the district 
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress in the aggravated assault case (Resp. 
Br., pp.16-20), and that he did not show the district court abused its discretion when it 
allowed the State to admit evidence of his prior burglary conviction to impeach him 
(Resp. Br., pp.20-23). 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's argument that, with respect 
to the motion to suppress in the aggravated assault case, Mr. Smith's implied consent to 
the blood draw was valid because there was no evidence he revoked his implied 
consent. Contrary to the State's representation of the facts, the parties stipulated that 
Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw. Idaho's implied consent statute does not 
justify a warrantless blood draw where the driver refuses to consent. Thus, under the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. 
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Because Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw, the officers needed a 
warrant before they could perform the blood draw. The officers did not obtain a warrant, 
and the involuntary blood draw therefore violated Mr. Smith's constitutional rights. 
Thus, the district court erred when it denied the motion to suppress in the aggravated 
assault case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Smith's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to suppress in the 
possession case? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to suppress in the 
aggravated assault case? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Smith's motion in 
limine in the aggravated assault case and permitted the State to impeach his 
credibility with his prior conviction for burglary? 
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I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress In The 
Possession Case 
Mr. Smith asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress in the possession case. The traffic stop was unlawfully extended. Officer 
Cwik's Terry1 frisk of Mr. Smith's jacket was unlawful, and even if the Terry frisk of the 
jacket were valid, the removal of the canister from the sock exceeded the scope of the 
frisk. Mr. Smith was not given Miranda2 warnings despite being in custody, and 
during the traffic stop in response to Officer's Cwik's questioning about 
the items in the canister should therefore be the State's 
argument concerning the motion to suppress in the possession case is not remarkable, 
no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Smith refers the Court to pages 13-26 of 
his Appellant's Brief. 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress In The 
Aggravated Assault Case, Because The Warrantless Blood Draw Violated The 
Fourth Amendment 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Smith asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress in the aggravated assault case, because the warrantless blood draw violated 
the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw, and Idaho's 
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4 
implied consent statute does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who 
refuses to consent. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Smith did not 
voluntarily consent to the blood draw. Because Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to 
the blood draw, the officers needed a warrant before they could perform the blood draw. 
The officers did not obtain a warrant, and the involuntary blood draw therefore violated 
Mr. Smith's constitutional rights. Thus, the district court erred when it denied the motion 
to suppress in the aggravated assault case. 
The State argues that Mr. Smith's implied consent to the blood draw was valid, 
because the record contains no evidence that he revoked his implied consent. (Resp. 
Br., pp.16-19.) However, the parties stipulated that Mr. Smith did not consent to the 
blood draw. (Tr., May 31, 2013, p.40, Ls.9-14.) The stipulation is broad enough to 
encompass the fact that Mr. Smith refused to consent to the blood draw. 
B. The Warrantless Blood Draw Violated The Fourth Amendment Because 
Mr. Smith Did Not Voluntarily Consent To The Blood Draw Under The Totality Of 
The Circumstances 
Mr. Smith asserts that the warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth 
Amendment because he did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw under the totality 
of the circumstances. Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw. (Tr., May 31, 2013, 
p.40, Ls.9-14.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that "an implied consent statute 
such as Washington's and Idaho's does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a 
driver who refuses to consent ... or objects to the blood draw." State v. Halseth, 157 
Idaho 643, _, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014).3 Thus, under the totality of the 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court also recently held that it would no longer apply "Idaho's 
implied consent statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutionally allowed forced 
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circumstances, Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. See Missouri v. 
McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 
U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
Contrary to the State's representation of the facts in this case, the parties 
stipulated that Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw. The State contends that 
Mr. Smith "argued that he did not affirmatively consent to the blood draw." (Resp. 
Br., p.18 (citing Tr., May 31, 2013, p. 40, Ls.5-14 ).) But the passage cited by the State, 
as made clear in the Appellant's Brief (App. Br., p.28), actually contains the parties' 
stipulation that Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw. At the motion to suppress 
hearing, counsel for Mr. Smith informed the district court that "Mr. Smith didn't consent 
to the blood draw. That's also a stipulation between the parties." (Tr., May 31, 2013, 
p.40, Ls.9-11.) The district court stated, "Unless there was an implied consent," and 
counsel replied, "That's correct." (Tr., May 31, 2013, p.40, Ls.12-14.) 
"Stipulations are the agreements of, and may be relied upon as, undisputed 
proof." State v. Hochrein, 154 Idaho 993, 1000 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Reding v. 
Reding, 141 Idaho 369, 373 (2005); State v. Trimming, 89 Idaho 440, 444 (1965)). 
"Stipulations are a form of judicial admission. A judicial admission obviates the 
necessity for proof of facts within the ambit of a distinct and unequivocal admission or 
stipulation so made." Perry v. Schaumann, 110 Idaho 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). "Admissions in open court by a prosecuting 
attorney, or by the counsel for the accused, are conclusive." Trimming, 89 Idaho at 445. 
warrantless blood draws." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, _, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014) 
(overruling State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 
368 (1989)). 
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"Admissions by the prosecuting attorney of material facts are to be construed in favor of 
the accused." Id. 
Here, the parties made an oral stipulation. (See Tr., May 31, 2013, p. 40, Ls.9-
14.) "Oral stipulations in the presence of the court and on the record are traditionally 
held binding." Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 703 (2005). "A stipulation is a 
contract. The enforceability of an oral stipulation is determined by contract principles." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hochrein, 154 Idaho at 1000. "An 
enforceable contract requires distinct understanding common to both parties." Kirk, 141 
Idaho at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The parties in this case stipulated that Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood 
draw. (Tr., May 31, 20·13, p. 40, Ls.9-14.) Pursuant to the above case law, that 
stipulation is undisputed proof that Mr. Smith did not consent. See Trimming, 89 Idaho 
at 444; Hochrein, 154 Idaho at 1000. 
The stipulation is broad enough to encompass the fact that Mr. Smith refused to 
consent to the blood draw. The context of the stipulation was the dispute over whether 
Idaho's implied consent statute would justify the blood draw even though Mr. Smith did 
not consent. Before the State entered into the stipulation, it argued, based on State v. 
Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364 (Ct. App. 2010), that "protests to the blood draw in the current 
case do not invalidate the consent." (R., p.172.) The State further contended, "Having 
received the benefit of the bargain of implied consent, the driver may not void consent 
already given." (R., p.172.) At the motion to suppress hearing, the State argued that 
the district court was bound to follow cases such as Wheeler, "taking our factual 
situation that we have here and saying that's reasonable." (Tr., May 31, 2013, p.43, 
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Ls.12-19.) Those arguments indicate that the State, in the stipulation, agreed to the fact 
that Mr. Smith refused to consent to the blood draw. See State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 
588 n.3 (Ct. App. 2013) ("EIiis's motion to suppress indicates that Ellis agreed to the fact 
that a Fourth Amendment waiver was included in his parole agreement".). 
Mr. Smith also suggested that he refused to consent. At the motion to suppress 
hearing, he asserted, 
what we have here is whether or not an individual can withdraw their 
consent, can say, "Well, I know that on the roadways I've given implied 
consent to give blood. But at some point I'm not agreeing to that 
anymore. I don't want the State to draw blood," and whether that's 
something that you can do and whether the states are able to modify by 
statute the ability of a defendant to revoke consent. And we don't think 
that the states can. 
(Tr., May 31, 2013, p.42, L.24- p.43, L.7.) 
The parties' discussion of whether implied consent may be withdrawn indicates 
they had a common distinct understanding that Mr. Smith refused to consent to the 
blood draw. See Kirk, 141 Idaho at 703. If the stipulation did not contemplate that 
Mr. Smith refused to consent, there would have been no need for the parties to discuss 
whether implied consent may be withdrawn. Further, to the extent that the stipulation is 
an admission by the prosecuting attorney of material facts, it should be construed in 
favor of Mr. Smith. See Trimming, 89 Idaho at 445; Perry, 110 Idaho at 598. Thus, the 
stipulation that Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw is broad enough to 
encompass the fact that Mr. Smith refused to consent to the blood draw. 
Because the parties stipulated that Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw, 
Mr. Smith did not elaborate on his refusal. The State argues that there is no evidence 
that Mr. Smith revoked or withdrew his implied consent. (Resp. Br., p.18.) But a 
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stipulation "obviates the necessity for proof of facts within the ambit" of the stipulation. 
Perry, 110 Idaho at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the parties 
stipulated that Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw (Tr., May 31, 2013, p. 40, 
Ls.9-14 ), Mr. Smith was not required to present evidence that he withdrew his consent 
or otherwise refused to consent. See Perry, 110 Idaho at 598. Thus, Mr. Smith did not 
elaborate on his refusal. (See, e.g., Tr., May 31, 2013, p. 40, L.5 - p.42, L.13.) In the 
absence of a stipulation, Mr. Smith may have offered additional evidence. The State 
should not be heard to complain now that Mr. Smith did not present evidence showing 
that he did not consent to the blood draw, after it agreed to a stipulation that obviated 
the need to present such evidence. See Perry, 110 Idaho at 598. 
In fact, because the stipulation advantaged the State by narrowing the disputed 
issues in the motion to suppress, judicial estoppel precludes the State from seeking, as 
it has in its Respondent's Brief, a position incompatible with the stipulation. "The 
doctrine of judicial estoppel sounds in equity and is invoked at the discretion of the 
court." McCal/ister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894 (2012). "Judicial estoppel precludes a 
party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second 
position that is incompatible with the first." Hoagland v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900, 
912 (2005). "The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial 
system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the 
dignity of the judicial proceeding." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "It is intended 
to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system." Id. 
As the district court indicated, the stipulation narrowed the contested issues in 
the motion to suppress to "solely a legal issue on the implied consent." (See 
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Tr., May 31, 2013, p.39, Ls.7-9.) This narrowing of the issues was a consideration or 
advantage given to the State, because the State (and Mr. Smith) received the benefit of 
not having to argue additional issues. See Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 
147 Idaho 774, 780 (2009) (explaining that some consideration is a necessary element 
of a valid contract such as a stipulation agreement, and receiving a benefit is 
consideration). Because the State advantageously took the position that Mr. Smith did 
not consent to the blood draw, it cannot now seek a second position that is incompatible 
with that stipulation. See Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 912. Thus, judicial estoppel 
precludes the State from seeking a position, as it has in its Respondent's Brief, 
incompatible with the stipulation. 
Contrary to the State's representation of the facts, the parties stipulated that 
Mr. Smith did not consent to the blood draw. (Tr., May 31, 2013, p. 40, Ls.9-14.) The 
stipulation is broad enough to encompass the fact that Mr. Smith refused to consent to 
the blood draw. As discussed above, the Halseth Court held that Idaho's implied 
consent statute does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to 
consent. Halseth, 157 Idaho at_, 339 P.3d at 371. Thus, under the totality of the 
circumstances, Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. See McNeely, 
569 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. at 1556; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. 
Because Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw, the officers 
needed a warrant before they could order the blood draw. See State v. LaMay, 140 
Idaho 835, 837-38 (2004). The officers did not obtain a warrant (see Tr., May 31, 2013, 
p.40, Ls.5-9), and the involuntary blood draw therefore violated Mr. Smith's 
constitutional rights. See LaMay, 140 Idaho at 837-38. Thus, the district court erred 
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when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to suppress in the aggravated assault case. The 
judgment of conviction in the aggravated assault case should be vacated with respect to 
the driving under the influence charge, the order denying the motion to suppress should 
be reversed, and that portion of the aggravated assault case should be remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
II I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Smith's Motion In Limine In 
The Aggravated Assault Case And Permitted The State To Impeach His Credibility With 
His Prior Conviction For Burglary 
Mr. Smith asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion in limine in the aggravated assault case and permitted the State to impeach his 
credibility with his prior conviction for burglary, because the district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards. The district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards because it did not weigh the probative 
value of the evidence of the prior conviction against its unfairly prejudicial effect. 
Mr. Smith further asserts that the State will be unable to show that the district court's 
error in denying the motion in limine on the burglary conviction is harmless. Because 
the State's argument concerning the motion in limine is not remarkable, no further reply 




For the above reasons, as well as the reasons in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Smith 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction in the possession 
case, reverse the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, and remand the 
possession case to the district court for further proceedings. Mr. Smith also respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction in the aggravated assault 
case with respect to the driving under the influence charge, reverse the order denying 
the motion to suppress, and remand that portion of the aggravated assault case to the 
district court for further proceedings. Further, Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the rest of the judgment of conviction in the aggravated assault case and 
remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2015. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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